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Grain Contracting Strategies to Induce
Delivery and Performance in Volatile Markets
William W. Wilson and Bruce Dahl
One of the impacts of higher prices along with greater volatility in futures and basis is that
there is pressure for an escalation in cash contracting for grain. This volatility has resulted in
an unprecedented level of contracting with growers in recent years. There is a wide array of
cash contracts with varying terms. There is also a growing realization of growers not de-
livering on contracts, in part due to escalation in postcontract prices. These are evolving as
major strategic issues for buyers and the marketing system, particularly as buyers seek to use
such contracting strategies as an element of risk mitigation. There are three purposes of this
article. First is to provide a broad survey of contract terms used in grain contracting with
growers. Second, we illustrate some issues in contracting of some of the grains (durum,
malting barley) in the upper Midwest. Third, we show some of the common contract clauses
being adapted in these contracts. Finally, we summarize these issues with respect to industry
implications.
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Markets for many components of grain prices
have become more volatile in recent years,
which has heightened interest in issues re-
garding contracting. Contracting involves risk
sharing between buyers and sellers. In com-
parison, hedging in futures markets results in
risk being transferred to an anonymous third
party. One of the challenges in contracting is
determining the appropriate risk premium ac-
crued by participants, and how that is shared
between the buyer and seller. An important
source of risk is contract nonperformance or
delivery (breach). This risk has evolved as a
major problem for buyers and the marketing
system, particularly as buyers seek to use such
contracting strategies as an element of risk
mitigation.
These problems are compounded by a
number of factors. One is the competition for
acres, commonly referred to as the battle for
acres. The impact of this competition is for an
escalation of preplant contracting, in which a
major feature of intercrop and interfirm com-
petition relates to alternative contract terms.
Second is that while there are terms in com-
modity type grain contracts, contracting in this
competitive environment has resulted in chal-
lenges to the structure of contract terms to be
incentive compatible. Third, if a contract is
offered by a buyer, it is done so in part as a
means of risk mitigation. Consequently, if one
party breaches, it abrogates the risk mitigation
strategy of the counter party. Finally, and im-
portantly, all buyers confront the business re-
lationship challenge of whether to initiate legal
proceedings against farmers or suppliers who
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 2009 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationknowingly breach their contract. While there
are differing views on this alternative, it re-
mains an outstanding strategic issue.
The purpose of this paper is to motivate the
problem of contracting and address some of the
issues confronting the grain industry related to
contracting. There are three specific purposes.
First, we provide a description of terms used in
grain contracts with growers. An emphasis of
these terms relates to options and mechanisms
used to entice performance. Second, we illus-
trate some issues in contracting of some spe-
cialty grains, durum, and malting barley in the
upper Midwest. Third, we show some of the
common contract clauses being adapted in
these contracts. Finally, we summarize these
purposes with respect to industry implications.
The paper is organized as follows. First we
describe volatility and risk and why this pro-
vides a motive for the escalation in contracting.
Then we discuss what we observe as growth in
contracting for grains. This discussion includes
a description of contract terms and contract
competition. We illustrate some of the chal-
lenges, in this case as applied to contracting for
durum wheat. Finally, we discuss mechanisms
to assure contract performance.
Volatility
It is now common knowledge that there has
been an escalation in price volatility in recent
years. While there may be debate about why or
whether it will continue, all market participants
acknowledge that the escalation in volatility
has increased risk in grain marketing.
There are several points that are perhaps less
recognized. First, not only has there been an
escalation involatility in the underlying futures
markets, but there has been an increase in
volatility in several other elements of prices.
For example, the basis in many markets has
increased similarly (Figure 1, as an example).
In fact, for wheat traded at the Minneapolis
Grain Exchange (MGEX), the basis volatility
has increased sharply, and in some periods, it
has been more volatile than the underlying
futures market price. Taken together, this has
reduced the hedging effectiveness of the in-
strument (though it remains better than alter-
natives) and severely altered optimal hedge
ratios. Similar observations exist at many other
basis markets. There has also been a radical
change in volatility in premiums/discounts in
grains, as well as in shipping costs, notably
ocean rates, among rates for other modes. All
of these points have implications for buyers.
There are numerous potential causes of this
escalation in volatility. Some attribute this es-
calation to mutual fund trading, ethanol, among
others. Importantly, for most grains there has
been a sharp reduction in the stocks/use ratio (at
least through 2007/2008), which ultimately is
the most important factor that caused thegrowth
in volatility. In part, this volatility is caused by
the differing growth rates in supply and demand
for major commodities, compounded by ethanol
and tempered a bit by yield risk.
Figure 1. Minneapolis Basis for HRS Wheat 14% (Minneapolis Grain Exchange, 2009)
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are expected to persist in future years, it is
expected that volatility will remain higher than
in earlier years, albeit less than observed in
2008. More likely, this trend will persist for 4–8
years until new crop production technologies
are adopted and ultimately improve the dy-
namics of the supply/demand balance. Never-
theless, a primary reason buyers and sellers
have been seeking, or exploring, alternative
contracting strategies is due in part to the re-
duced ability of traditional mechanisms for
controlling risks. Notably a contributing factor
to the growth in contracting is in response to
futures, which have become more volatile, and
options, which, as a result of the greater vola-
tility results in higher premiums.
Contracting for Grains
There are three topics we discuss related to
contracting for grains. One is the apparent
growth in contracting and potential contribut-
ing factors. Second, we discuss the battle for
acres in particular, and the implications for
contracting. And, third, we present a summary
of some of the major clauses contained in grain
contracts in the new emerging contracting
competition.
Growth in Contracting
The most recent broad based survey on con-
tracting in agriculture (to our knowledge) was
done by MacDonald et al. (2004), who exam-
ined contracting of commodities in the United
States in 2001 and compared the use of con-
tracts to that in previous time periods. They
indicate that the number of farms using con-
tracts and value of production under contract
increased from 1969 to 2001. The number of
farms using contracts increased from 6 to 11%
from 1969 to 2001 and the value of production
increased from 12% in 1969 to 36% in 2001.
They illustrate that the share of wheat under
contract increased from 6% of value in 1991–
1993 to a high of 9% in 1996–1997 and de-
clinedto 5% in 2001. Most of thecontracting of
crops was focused in fruit, vegetables, rice,
sugar beets, and peanuts. Contracts in crops
were largely marketing contracts, while live-
stock contained both marketing and production
contracts. MacDonald et al. (2004) concluded
that the spot market is having difficulty pro-
viding accurate price signals for products
geared toward new consumer demands. They
indicate that this trend for increased use of
vertical coordination, through contracts and
ownership, will continue.
More recently, it is our observation that
contracting has escalated drastically. To docu-
ment this we conducted a survey of the prin-
cipal buyers of these commodities in the upper
Midwest.1 While it is difficult to document this
observation without a broad-based survey,
based on our interaction and dialogue with the
industry, it is our generalization for some
commodities, preplanting contracting has been
adopted for approximately 70% of industry
demand, and has now become common busi-
ness practice in the industry. We would attri-
bute that this practice is in response to three
important factors. One is the battle for acres,
which we describe in more detail below. The
second is the apparent escalation in price risk,
as a result of the increase in volatility. Third is
the apparent deterioration of, or unavailability
of, traditional hedging mechanisms for man-
aging risks.
Competition and the Battle for Acres:
Implications for Contracting
In part due to the growth in demands relative to
supplies, and shifts in agronomic technology
and production practices, a battle for acres
exists in many regions of United States agri-
culture. In some states, there are few cropping
opportunities and the battle is not as apparent.
1To be clear, this was a formal but not a compre-
hensive survey. In part this is due to the few number of
buyers in the region for these crops. We interviewed
the principal buyers (typically the largest 3–5) and had
them respond to questions about their contracts used
for buying grain from farmers. In all cases, they
provided their contracts for reference. Thus, though
not as comprehensive as in previous surveys, the scope
was to document an understanding of the extent of
contracting for these crops in this region, and the
contract terms.
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to describe competition largely between corn
and soybeans (as used in a recent article by
Grain Journal, 2009a, pp. 12–14) in discussions
related to 2008 and 2009 plantings. In contrast,
growers in North Dakota have up to 12–18
different crops that can be economically grown.
In fact, extension budgets normally contain re-
turns for this many crops (Swenson and Hau-
gen, 2008) and some elevators are now posting
prices for both old and new crops for up to 12
crops at one time. It should be noted, that in this
state the crops are apparently as diverse as any
other state with the exception of California.
As a result of this diversity of alternative
crops and the growth in genetically modified
row crops in nontraditional regions, there has
been a shift in production. The response has
been for an escalation in contracting. As ex-
amples, canola contracts have been offered for
2 years of production, along with Act of God
clauses forprescribed varieties,and some ofthe
ethanol plants were offering contracts for 3
years production. Most crops now have some
form of an Act of God clause included as a
contract term, or option. Most of the malting
barley is now bought on preplanting contracts
(Wilson, Gustafson, and Dahl, 2008). Some of
these are 1 year contracts with an option on a
second year, are offered up to 14 months prior
to harvest, and have relaxed quality require-
ments. There has been lesser contracting in
durum wheat, but during 2007, contracts were
offered in the spring for new crop (preplanting)
delivery and during the 2008 contracting sea-
son, contracts were offered with a record pre-
mium relative to Hard Red Spring Wheat
(HRS). And, many of the minor crops, includ-
ing canola, peas, beans, Sunflower, NuSun,
Vestive, etc., are all nearly 100% contracted.2
Contract Terms
By definition, a contract is a mechanism of risk
sharing. Risks are pervasive including risks on
price, quality, quantity, acceptance rates, etc.
Hedging in futures contracts provide a mecha-
nism to share an element of ‘‘price’’risk, which
is transferred to a third party. Thus, many
contracts that allow pricing relative to a ‘‘fu-
tures’’ price, essentially are allowing for third
party risk transfer. Absent of futures compo-
nent of pricing, risk is strictly shared between
buyer and seller!
Figure 2 characterizes the types of con-
tracting now used, as alternatives for pro-
curement strategy (adapted from Wilson and
Dahl, 2008). This figure highlights differences
that may be embedded in different contract
types. It illustrates the range of alternatives
and includes varying types of contracts, from
relying on simple spot transactions to the ex-
treme alternative—vertical integration. Ulti-
mately, it is the buyer that chooses where to be
positioned on this spectrum of alternatives as
they consider their purchasing and procurement
strategies.
We used our survey (see footnote 1) to un-
derstand the scope and extent of contracting
currently used in the upper Midwest. These
contracts would be considered as marketing
contracts, as opposed to production contracts
(Michigan Farm Bureau, 2009) and should not
be considered as specialty crops since at least in
the past they had been considered as commod-
ities. These are represented as crops, which are
not as readily tradable as the major commodities
such as corn, soybeans, and winter wheat.
The major contract terms are categorized
and summarized and categorized below.3
Act of God. Most of the contracts, though
not all, contain Act of God provisions. It is
important that there is virtually no standard-
ization in the specification and treatment
of the Act of God feature among different
crops and buyers. Sometimes these clauses
are simply included, some are offered as an
alternative,andsomeareofferedwithorwith-
out price differentials. These usually apply
to quantity only, though quality provisions
2These are based on our survey (see footnote 1)
and discussions with the principal buyers of each of
these crops.
3For obvious reasons it is not possible to disclose
the firm names etc., but that is not important for
purposes here.
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clause.
Premiums and discounts forquality deviations.
Premiums and discounts for quality deviations
are important provisions. Barrett (2009a) in-
dicated that one of the top 10 contract points
is to ‘‘Include provisions in your contracts
that spell out how, where and when quality
discounts, and premiums are to be deter-
mined.’’ Some contracts treat quality devia-
tions, which apply to market values at harvest.
Others are premiums and discounts that are
prespecified in the contract prior to planting.
At issue here is whether the buyer or seller
absorbs the price risk of quality deviations.
In fact, a recent legal dispute has been reg-
istered in Montana (Johnson, 2009) in which
grain was sold in a preharvest contract with post
harvest price discounts specified. Upon delivery
the buyer allegedly applied different and more
stringent discounts, no doubt reflecting the
market in which the grain was being sold. This
illustrates the nature of issues about preharvest
specification of postharvest discounts.
Right of first refusal on surplus production.
This is a common clause and most buyers want
this right. The issue is at what price. Some
contracts provide this right at market prices (as
opposed to contract prices). Others do so at
some prescribed price differential determined
at time of contracting.
Pricing. There are many types of pricing
mechanisms including, as examples: Simple
fixed price; Basis to single futures, or mul-
tiple futures across different crops or ex-
changes; andtwo–part pricing which involves
a base quantity at contract price and surplus
production sold at a discount reflecting im-
plicit storage costs. In a number of contracts
there are option type features (implicit) in-
cluding minimum prices, Min/max, Look-
back options, and average prices (equivalent
to an Asian option). These latter mechanisms
have embedded option type features; our
observation is that they are not included with
a price differential to a nonoption type con-
tract term. Hence, the buyer is absorbing the
implicit cost of the option. Typically, growers
would have the right to select the time when
price is established.
Storage options. Most contracts require on-
farm storage along with a buyers call. Storage
fees apply after a specified time and on-farm
samples must be submitted. Some require
sampling and testing at time of delivery.
Agronomics.Most contracts requirecertified
seed bought from buyer, though some allow
the certified seed to be bought in the open
market, but documentation of its use is re-
quired. And, it is common to declare or buyer
recommends acres for specified production.
Risk and Contracting: Case Study on
Durum Wheat
For illustration of issues related to risk and risk
sharing, we show some details of an analysis of
premiums that could be included in contracts
for durum wheat. This crop has experienced
problems similar to malting barley; in fact they
Figure 2. Spectrum of Buying and Contracting Strategies for Grains and Oilseeds (adapted from
Wilson and Dahl, 2008)
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been a spot commodity and contracts were not
used. Basically, supply exceeded demand and
there was no need to contract. Over time there
has been a decline in acres planted, ultimately
to the point that the industry has had to rely
more on imports. The reasons contributing to
this decline include disease (i.e., vomitoxin),
changing agronomic competitiveness, a change
in the geography of production, and Canadian
competition. The primary competing crops to
both durum and malting barley are HRS wheat
and canola, etc., in addition to soybeans, and up
to 6–8 other more specialty grains.
The strategy alternatives that are compared
are among HRS hedged and unhedged, and
durum wheat priced and unpriced. These are
compared in terms of return and risk as defined
below.
Methods to Evaluate Risks for Competing Crop
Contracts: Durum versus HRS Wheat
There is substantial risk in the production of
durum.Theserisksareprimarilyrelatedtoprice,
yield, and quality. In each case, these risks ex-
ceed those of the HRS wheat. Specifically, price
risk is much morevolatile than HRS wheat, and
there is no public market for hedging, in con-
trast to HRS wheat that can be readily hedged.
Traditionally there is limited transparency in
forward contract values. In addition, the spread
between durum and HRS futures is more vol-
atile than the typical basis for HRS wheat.
Yieldsarealsomorerisky,andthishasincreased
in part due to the shift in geography of produc-
tion (i.e., it has shifted to regions more prone to
drought). Finally, there is greater quality risk,
which has two parts. One is the risk of not
conforming to Nos. 1 and 2 grade requirements
(falling numbers, protein, etc.). The other is the
discounts that would apply if rejected, which are
highly risky. In addition, there are slight differ-
ences in crop insurance provisions.
Mathematical Description of Model
Analytically wecompare the risks andreturns of
two crops, HRS and durum. While this ignores
impacts of other crops, these two crops are
directly substitutable and the results illustrate
the scope of intercrop contract competition.
A payoff function is defined as net returns
over variable cost per acre or: Pi 5 gross
revenue – direct costs for choice i, where
i 5 1...n, for each crop (HRS or durum).
Returns are defined in Equations 1 and 2 for
producers without a contract and with a con-
tract, respectively:
(1) EðPinocontÞ5 ^ Y  ð^ P1   ^ Si 1 ^ P2  ð 1   ^ SiÞÞ
1ðindemnitypaymentÞ Ci
(2) EðPicontÞ5 ^ Y  ð^ P3   ^ Si 1 ^ P4  ð 1   ^ SiÞÞ
1ðindemnitypaymentÞ Ci
where: E(Pi) is the expected net return per acre
of crop i, Yis the yield (bu/acre), P1 and P2 are
random local prices with no contract with
quality met, and quality not met, P3 and P4 are
local prices for contracted volumes with quality
met, and quality not met, respectively ($/bu)
and may be fixed or random based on the type
of contract; indemnity payment is the value of
the payoff if insurance is collected on yield
shortfalls; Ci is the direct cost of production for
crop i and includes seed,herbicides, fungicides,
insecticides, fertilizers, fuel, repairs, interest,
and crop insurance and is the same across
strategies, but varies by crop (HRS versus
durum). Quality acceptance risk is modeled
using S ˆ
i which is a binary variable reflecting
quality, which is drawn based on acceptance
rates for the highest quality durum or hard red
spring. The^indicates thevariable is random and
a distribution is used for its value. Indirect costs
such as land andtaxes are excluded because they
are fixed and constant across crops and choices.
An important source of risk is that of qual-
ity: not being acceptable for the specified qual-
ity level. The most frequent factors degrading
for durum are color, test weight, falling numbers
(a measure of sprout damage), and vomitoxin
resulting in excess deoxynivalenol (DON). Other
risks are yields, prices, and discounts applied
for not meeting specifications.
There are four steps in our analytical
methodology. First, we derive the Pi for each
contracting strategy. Second, we use stochastic
simulation to iterate outcomes of P for each
crop and contract alternative. Third, stochastic
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ingsamongthechoicesacrossarangeofArrow–
Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficients. Sto-
chastic dominance was used to determine risk
efficient decisions among grower choices using
Simetar (Schumann, Feldman, and Richardson,
2006). The range of absolute risk aversion co-
efficients (ARAC) was from 0 to 0.108 where
the upper bound for the ARAC was estimated
using McCarl and Bessler’s (1989) nonnegati-
vity certainty equivalent approach. Fourth,
stochastic efficiency with respect to a function
(SERF) analysis is used to derive the certainty
equivalents that decision makers would place
on a risky alternative relative to a no risk in-
vestment. Certainty equivalents are estimated
across a range of risk aversion coefficients and
used to rank alternatives. Risk premiums were
measured as the difference in certainty equiv-
alents relative to the HRS hedged strategy. The
premium indicates the change that would have
to occur in the certainty equivalent of net pay-
offs in order to induce a change in preferences.
Crop budgets included variable costs for
both durum and HRS wheat production in
Northwest North Dakota for the 2009 crop year
(Swenson and Haugen, 2008). The random
variables in the crop budgets included yields,
prices, and crop quality discounts and are
shown in Table 1. Yield distributions were fit-
ted from annual data from 1995 to 2007 for
dryland crop reporting districts in Western
North Dakota and Eastern Montana from
United States Department of Agriculture–
National Agricultural Statistics Service (2008).
Distributions for futures, protein premiums/
discounts, and durum prices were similarly
fitted from annual data from 1995 to 2007 to
determine variability. Means for futures prices
and basis for HRS wheat and cash prices for
durum wheat were adjusted to current levels for
September futures on January 6, 2009 (7.06/bu)
and new crop bids for durum (7.61/bu). The
probability of crop quality meeting specifica-
tions was determined from U.S. HRS wheat
(Minnesota, Montana,North Dakota, and South
Dakota) and U.S. Northern Grown Durum
Wheat (Montana, North Dakota) crop quality
surveys from 1995 to 2007 (North Dakota State
Wheat Commission, 1995–2007ab). These data
were used to derive the probability of meeting
No. 1 Hard Amber Durum (HAD) for durum or
proportion 14% protein or higher for HRS
wheat. If quality specifications were not met:
for durum, a 20 c/bu discount was applied for
terminal durum; for HRS wheat we applied a
protein discount (random) for 13% proteinwheat.
Random draws for yields of HRS and durum
wheat were correlated (0.81) and prices and
probabilities of meeting quality were correlated
(Table 2). For HRS wheat, prices were esti-
mated from random draws for acceptable
quality for delivery to both Minneapolis and the
Pacific Northwest (PNW). Since northwestern
North Dakota and Montana farmer prices are
determined by prices at Minneapolis and the
Pacific Northwest ports, the local price is de-
rived as the MAX [net returns selling to PNW,
Table 1. Distributions and Parameters for Random Elements in Comparative Crop Budgets
Item Distribution Mean/Probability Std. Dev.
Yield HRS wheat Logistic 24.69 3.02
Yield durum Logistic 24.55 4.21
HRS wheat quality Discrete 0.64 quality met
Durum quality Discrete 0.36 quality met
HRS wheat futures Normal 7.06 1.36
Mpls durum Logistic 7.61 3.10
14% Protein premium Mpls Lognormal 0.76 0.58
14% Protein premium PNW Normal 0.97 0.21
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recent shipping costs from Western North
Dakota, these prices were used to determine
returns over variable costs.
Alternativeselling strategiesweresimulated
5000 iterations using @Risk (Palisade Corpo-
ration, 2002). The stopping criteria indicated
the model had settled so that successive itera-
tions would not result in a significant change
in distribution parameters. Distributions for
each of the selling alternatives were then eval-
uated using Simetar (Schumann, Feldman, and
Richardson, 2006) to estimate certainty equiv-
alents for each of the selling strategies across
the range of relevant absolute risk aversion
attitudes. The upper range for absolute risk
aversions was determined following McCarl
and Bessler (1989). Risk premiums were esti-
mated as the difference in certainty equivalents
relative to a base strategy.
Results
The results of the simulated distributions for
the alternative selling strategies indicate durum
wheat had higher mean returns over variable
costs than HRS wheat (Table 3 and Figure 3).
Durum wheat (unhedged and fixed price)
also has much greater variability than the
HRS wheat strategies. In fact for the unhedged
strategies, durum wheat returns over variable
costs had a standard deviation nearly three
times that of the HRS wheat unhedged strategy.
Forthe hedged/fixed price strategies, thedurum
wheat fixed price had standard deviations
nearly two times that of the HRS wheat strategy.
Risk premiums were calculated as an alter-
native for different risk attitude parameters
relative to the HRS wheat hedged. For risk
neutral growers the HRS wheat hedged strategy
was preferred to the unhedged HRS wheat
strategy, The risk premiums for durum fixed
price is preferred to HRS wheat hedged by
$6.84 per acre, while durum unhedged was
preferred by $6.43 per acre (Table 4 and Figure
4). For more risk averse growers, risk pre-
miums for durum wheat become negative, in-
dicating that these strategies are less preferred
to the HRS wheat hedged strategy. In fact, for
slightly risk averse growers, HAD priced be-
comes the least preferred strategy (largest
negative risk premium) and for growers with
risk aversion greater than 0.018, HAD fixed
price becomes the second least preferred
strategy. For moderately risk averse growers,
durum wheat unpriced would require an in-
crease incertainty equivalent of$214/acre tobe
considered equal to HRS wheat hedged. Durum
wheat fixed price would have to increase by
$24/acre. Thus, for growers that are even
slightly risk averse, durum unpriced and fixed
price become lesser preferred alternatives. As
the risk attitude of the grower becomes more
risk averse, the level of preference of HRS
wheat hedged over these alternatives escalates.
The above illustrates that durum wheat is
more risky than HRS wheat. Hence growers
should expect either a risk premium to induce
them to plant the crop, or, contract terms that
would reduce risk. As shown here, the risk
premium for durum wheat decreases sub-
stantially if a contract can eliminate the price




















HRS Fut 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14% Mpls 1.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00
14% PNW 1.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13% Discount 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Durum 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quality HRS 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quality durum 1.00 0.00 0.00
HRS yields 1.00 0.81
Durum yields 1.00
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to our other analysis (Wilson, Gustafson, and
Dahl, 2008) to like provisions in other crops.
Contracting Challenge: Inducing Delivery
(conformance, or nonbreach)
A problem confronting the industry in this type
of contracting is how to induce delivery if there
is a post contract increase in prices. Simply, if
prices increase after the contract is agreed to,
there is a major challenge to the buyer to assure
nonbreach on the part of the seller. There are
several examples all of which have been
common in recent years. First, if the price in-
creases after contracting, but before planting,
there is a risk the grower may divert acres to
other higher-yielding more profitable crops.
Second, in the same situation, growers would
demand the higher current market price, and
threaten to divert acres if not provided. Third,
postharvest, there is an incentive to breach on
delivery. These problems are all compounded
by the undesirable outcome of legal proceed-
ings resulting in bad customer relations at a
time when the buyers need growers.
These are all problems and no doubt are the
reasons for the multitude of contract provisions
Table 3. Results for Simulated Distributions of Returns over Variable Costs by Strategy
HRS 14 Unhedged HAD Unpriced HRS 14 Hedged HAD Fixed Price
Minimum 254 2271 245 269
Maximum 392 1,051 300 696
Mean 86 93 86 93
Standard deviation 55 142 40 73
Variance 3,132 20,418 1,608 5,409
Skewness 0.54 1.39 0.38 1.66
Kurtosis 3.71 5.70 4.03 8.32
Figure 3. Cumulative Distribution Functions for Returns over Variable Costs of Crop and Contract
Alternatives
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tract provisions, other strategies are pursued.
The conventional recourse refers to the
contract provisions of the National Grain and
Feed Association (NGFA). These contract
terms and provisions, as well as arbitration
mechanisms are widely adopted, well-accepted
in practice, and conform to Uniform Com-
mercial Code and state laws. Hence, any sub-
stantive deviations from these terms and pro-
visions are treated with caution. These contract
provisions have special regulations and terms
to address most issues including definition of
terms, confirmation of contracts (Rule 3), al-
ternations of contracts (Rule 4), mechanisms to
deal with overfill and underfill of contracts, and
failure to perform (Rule 28).
Rule 28 is clear. It is the sellers’ obligation
to notify the buyer of his/her inability to com-
plete the contract. If the seller fails to notify the
buyer of his/her inability to complete a con-
tract, then the liability escalates until the buyer
can determine that the seller has defaulted. In
either case, the options for the buyer are to
(1) agree to an extension, or (2) buy-in the
defaulted portion of the contract for the account
of the seller, or (3) cancel the defaulted portion
of the contract at the fair market value. In
any of these cases the damages are ascribed to
the seller. If the party repudiates a contract,
the damages are more difficult to ascertain
(Bylund, 2008) and the damages are fixed as
of the time of repudiation. These liabilities are
all clear. However, their execution is more
problematic in cases where there is only one
buyer for a specific quality, and/or when the
Table 4. Risk Premiums for Alternative Selling Strategies Relative to HRS Wheat 14 Hedged, by
Risk Attitude
ARAC HRS 14 Unhedged HAD Unhedged HRS 14 Hedged HAD Fixed Price
0 (0.04) 6.43 — 6.84
0.0045 (3.25) (25.54) — (0.03)
0.0090 (6.07) (44.95) — (4.74)
0.0135 (8.55) (58.29) — (8.27)
0.0180 (10.73) (68.95) — (11.07)
0.0225 (12.64) (79.30) — (13.35)
0.0270 (14.30) (91.17) — (15.24)
0.0315 (15.73) (105.27) — (16.81)
0.0360 (16.94) (120.64) — (18.11)
0.0405 (17.96) (135.56) — (19.19)
0.0450 (18.81) (148.87) — (20.08)
0.0495 (19.49) (160.22) — (20.81)
0.0540 (20.04) (169.73) — (21.41)
0.0585 (20.46) (177.66) — (21.90)
0.0630 (20.78) (184.29) — (22.31)
0.0675 (21.00) (189.85) — (22.66)
0.0720 (21.15) (194.55) — (22.95)
0.0765 (21.22) (198.54) — (23.21)
0.0810 (21.24) (201.94) — (23.44)
0.0855 (21.20) (204.85) — (23.64)
0.0900 (21.12) (207.36) — (23.82)
0.0945 (21.00) (209.53) — (23.98)
0.0990 (20.85) (211.40) — (24.13)
0.1035 (20.68) (213.03) — (24.27)
0.1080 (20.48) (214.45) — (24.39)
4This differs from some of the buyers of the major
commodities that in 2008 decided not to offer forward
contracts oncorn and soybeansdue to the extremehigh
risk (volatility), high price, and consequences on
margin calls.
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does not provide provisions to assure that grain
from any origin can be reasonably delivered.
In addition, the NGFA trade rules have
prescribed procedures for arbitration. These
rules have been thoroughly adopted throughout
the trade. Nevertheless, these trade rules do
need clarifications to make them fully adapt-
able in grower contracting. Most important is
that of defining the farmer as merchant and
citing the NGFA rules as a contract term.
Other Contract Terms
As a complement to the above, there are several
apparent strategies being explored by or used
by major buyers. These are described briefly.
Prepay in anticipation of nonperformance.
There is a provision in the rules at each of the
NGFA, in the MGEX rules (and each of these
rules are embedded in UCC 2–609) that gives
buyers the right to require suppliers to post cash
payments if there is a risk they may not perform
(as well as suggested as a provision by each of
Bylund, 2008 and Barrett, 2009). Specifically,
the MGEX cash trading rules indicate that the
buyer has the right to require sellers to make
security deposits equal to 10% of the contract
price, and additional deposits from time to time
to the extent of any advance above the contract
prices in the fair market value of the com-
modity (Rule 1006).
This rule is interesting because in concept it
is similar to the margining system that exists on
futures contracts in the United States. In each
case these rules are used to assure performance
on cash obligations. Though these concepts are
mandatory in the case of futures, the provision
is used very rarely in the case of cash traded
commodities.
The provision does set a precedent. At least
one major grain buyer has explored the idea of
imposing a margining system on cash con-
tracts. The simple idea is the buyer has to pay a
margin, which raises their costs. To offset this
cost and to assure performance the buyer would
require a margin–type payment by the supplier
(in this case the farmer). The grower would
recognize that if the margining capability is not
adopted, the price would have to be discounted
further due to the higher margin costs imposed
on the trader.
Pricing provisions. Several of the pricing
provisions that are being used ultimately
were defined as a means to induce delivery
against contracts. For example, a basis or
spread contract (i.e., as used in malting bar-
ley) would nearly completely neutralize the
grower against increases in the overall price
level. Also, a minimum price contract pro-
vision would do the same, but in this case
implicitly a premium is extracted from the
seller for providing this feature. Finally, and
interestingly, during 2008 one of the buyers
Figure 4. Risk Premiums for Durum Contracts Relative to HRS Wheat Hedged
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back’’ option on a forward purchase contract.
The grower would be guaranteed the maxi-
mum price between the contract period and
April 1. Essentially, this option is a look-back
provision and was used to discourage the
grower from switching crops prior to planting.
Each of these provisions implicitly has the
effect of nullifying incentives for growers to
shirk on their delivery terms. Ideally, these op-
tions wouldbe structured to neutralizegrowers’
returns between delivery andnondelivery. None
of them work perfectly, but, they go a long
way towards nearly neutralizing the grower’s
alternatives.
Jaw–boning. Finally, as a complement and
perhaps more important than the above, is
what may be referred to as contract jaw–
boning. This alternative is coming to domi-
nate the buyer–seller relationships. Simply,
buyers that contract ultimately need the grain,
and used the contract as a risk mitigation
strategy. Buyers don’t want to litigate against
suppliers routinely; and ultimately, farmers
need and want favorable contract provisions.
For these reasons, a number of contract
strategies are emerging. All buyers now want to
‘‘know the customer.’’ Of course, this concept
means also knowing their finances, organiza-
tional and ownership structure, etc., ultimately
with the goal of increasing the likelihood of
performance. Second, there is an inordinate
effort to get signed contracts, even recognizing
efforts of executing nonsigned contracts (Pates,
2008), or now electronically signed contracts
(Feedstuffs,2008).5Finally,one buyer hascreated
a ‘‘no trade list’’ for farmers that do not perform.
Some experts (e.g., Barrett, 2009; Barrett
and Pates, 2009; Bylund, 2008; Grain Journal,
2009b and 2009c; among others) are urging
buyers to establish a ‘‘Master Trading Agree-
ment’’ with their farmers. This agreement would
include numerous definitions and clarifica-
tions, including that the document would be
signed before entering into forward contracts,
the customer would acknowledge he/she is a
merchant and bound by unsigned confirmations
and would acknowledge that NGFA arbitration
would apply to dispute resolution, and that
the counterparty agrees that they can demand
assurances of performance if demanded, etc.
Then, the master agreement would be the un-
derlyingstructureofalltransactions.Ultimately,
this agreement would go a long ways toward
improving contract assurance, as well as em-
boldening buyer–seller relations. If there is a
potential for default, buyers can challenge
sellers by jawboning and then legal/arbitration
and ultimately rely on the grapevine among
farmers that will encourage performance.
Summary and Industry Impacts of Increased
Contracting for Grains
There has been an escalation in price risk dur-
ing the past several years. Most important is
that this escalation has occurred not only in
futures contracts, but also in numerous other
elements of grain market prices. Of interest, the
volatility of prices for grain commodities
without futures has in fact been greater than
that of contracts with futures; basis values have
become more volatile, and premiums/discounts
for quality have escalated in volatility. The
implications of this volatility is an increase in
risk, a deterioration of hedging effectiveness
using traditional instruments, and a desire to
seek alternative risk management mechanisms.
It is expected that this greater risk will likely
continue for 4–8 years. Concurrently, a battle
for acres has intensified in recent years for
many reasons. This battle has manifested in an
increase in contracting for grains that are not
easily hedgable using traditional mechanisms,
notably for crops such as malting barley, durum
wheat, white wheat, white corn, organic crops,
and numerous smaller crops including field
5As example, CHS indicated (AgWeek)t h a tt h e r e
has been an increase in verbal commitments and
growers subsequently tried to back out of contracts.
Traditionally verbal contracts had been the prevailing
practice. CHS issued a policy directive that all contracts
with farmers now must be signed. Country Operations
can accept fax or e-mail, or meet in person to complete
sales. It concluded that a deal is not locked in unless
there is a signature or electronic verification. Some
elevators sendrepresentativestofarms toget signatures.
They also adopted taped phone calls using these to
confirm trades. Cenex Harvest States has also taken
growers to court (small claims), to make the point that
would ultimately become apparent to other growers.
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oilseeds.
There are several industry implications of
these trends. Indeed, Heesch (2009) indicated
that risks confronting trades can be categorized
as those related to futures, financial, basis,
spreads, and freight. These risks are straight-
forward. To be clear, financial risks relate to the
ability to have sufficient capital to finance fu-
tureshedgepositions.Iftoocostly(duetohigher
prices and/or volatility), lenders may become
unable to finance elevators with additional
money required to stay operational. Risks
traderscanreadilyprotectincludefuturesprices,
freight costs, etc. However, risks that cannot be
protected include (1) growers selling or not
selling grain to the elevator; or (2) defaulting on
signed contracts for delivery, among others.
Taken together, these implications all imply
the risks of being in these markets have in-
creased. The normal response is to increase
margins. While appealing, increases in margins
provide the incentive for growers to hedge di-
rectly, to the extent possible, which precludes
committing thegrower to the handler. There are
a number ofimplications of these trends. One is
that operating costs to facilitate trading have
increased. There is greater risk as noted. All of
these risks will result in a further increase in
consolidation, as reflected by more mergers
and acquisitions.
A result of the increase in price risk is an
increase in contracting with growers. This in-
crease is in part due to the greater risks con-
fronting buyers and sellers, the battle for acres,
and ultimately is manifested in intense inter-
crop and interfirm competition that is reflected
in contract terms. Indeed, most contracts reflect
a sense of risk sharing and have the impact of
reducing bilateral risk for both buyers and
sellers. Importantly, and one of the primary
motivations for contracting is that having a
contract has the effect of reducing risk pre-
miums necessary to induce adopting a specific
crop alternative. In our illustrative case of
durum wheat, offering contracts has the effect
of reducing the risk premium for a moderately
risk averse grower, from $70–$80 to about $24/
acre. This effect is substantial and is no doubt
the reason for providing such contracts.
While counter–party risk, or the risk of
contract default, is important, there are nu-
merous legal mechanisms that can be used as a
means of mitigating risks. Most common are
the NGFA trade rules, as well as commercial
law. Despite this legal mechanism, as noted by
each of Heesch (2009), Bylund (2008), Barrett
(2009), and Barrett and Pates (2009) in recent
presentations, one of the major risks confront-
ing traders is the risk of contract performance
and of collecting damages if the other party is
unable or unwilling to perform. Concurrently,
alternatives exist and/or are emerging to induce
nonbreach. These alternatives include varying
forms of minimum price alternatives, look-back
options, prepayment by sellers in volatile mar-
kets, etc. Interestingly, many of these alterna-
tives have option type features, but, at least as
we can detect there are not apparent price dif-
ferentials for these alternatives. This implies
ultimately that the buyer is implicitly absorbing
the implicit option premium for such provisions.
Given the escalation in contracting that will
impact interfirm rivalry, a few suggestions are
warranted. Buyers should develop alternative
contract terms to offer growers. It would nearly
always be too risky to not offer alternatives
prior to planting. But, in contrast to current, we
would suggest it is important to offer these
terms to growers reflecting price differentials
among the alternatives. These differentials
should ideally reflect the difference in implicit
option value for the particular feature. In some
cases, greater risks require greater implicit
premiums etc. Then, growers can choose that
which provides the greatest risk reward bal-
ance. This assessment is important since ulti-
mately growers will have different risk aver-
sions and providing alternative reflecting price
differentials will allow more efficient contract
penetration.
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